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The subject of conflict of interest (CoI) has long preoccupied 
bioethicists, particularly as a threat to clinical independence and 
quality of care1,2 and as corrupting ethical practice in research.1,3 For 
example, pharmaceutical companies’ promotions and gifts act as 
inducements to influence doctors’ prescribing practices, maintaining 
company profits at the possible expense of good-quality healthcare.4,5 
To address the practice of referring patients to services (including 
services provided as part of clinical trials) in which the practitioner 
has a financial interest – the so-called perverse incentives problem – 
the Health Professions Council of SA (HPCSA) has elaborated detailed 
guidance to avoid unethical practices.6 Then there are the many 
documented examples of ‘bent’ science, where CoI has perverted 
the integrity of research. For example, researchers sponsored by the 
tobacco, asbestos and alcohol industries have often failed to declare 
their sources of funding when presenting findings that effectively 
exonerated these industries from producing hazardous products.7-11 
We argue that bioethical debate should extend beyond the ethical 
practice of individual health professionals such as clinicians 
or researchers, to include the ethics of public policy-making. 
Opportunities for CoI arise when health sector policies, or those in 
other sectors that affect upstream health determinants, are poorly 
informed by an ethical perspective. Powerful elites, who stand 
to benefit directly from policy directions, may have influence not 
equally afforded to other affected parties, threatening the ethics of 
public policy formulation. 
Policy making is inherently political, involving negotiation and 
compromise based on power and/or social consensus that is 
shaped by scientific evidence. To protect the integrity of the 
process, it is essential that experts and advisors behave ethically and 
professionally, particularly in their critical evaluation of evidence. 
Conflict of interest involving experts, 
scientists and professionals and industry
Michaels12 explores the problem of ‘bent science’ which underplays 
the risks of hazardous chemical and other exposures. He postulates 
that this process is essentially about the marketing of doubt. The 
scientific method cannot prove 100% that an exposure is safe nor 
that it is hazardous; at best it provides the basis for informed and 
considered judgements on the likelihood of its causing adverse 
health effects, and hence the ability to say that a product is not 
safe. Criteria for demonstrating a harmful effect include adducing 
cumulative evidence, showing consistency in multiple studies, 
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demonstrating dose/response effects, temporality and biological 
plausibility. However, while the requirement to meet these criteria 
may strengthen grounds for causality, it may also provide product 
defenders with latitude to sow doubt on findings of harm. 
Furthermore, evidence may be overtly manipulated by inappropriate 
study design with insufficient power, to yield results that suggest the 
product has no effects. Under these circumstances, the absence of 
evidence may be misconstrued as evidence of the absence of any 
harmful effects. Skepticism is usually part of scientific method but 
tends to be selectively applied by vested interests to cast doubt on 
best estimates of risk, compiled honestly and comprehensively from 
the evidence at hand, with public safety in mind. The role of industry-
funded scientists in producing and lending credibility to such bent 
science is well recognised.13 
When such research is fed into the policy-making process, and where 
critical review is not provided, it can result in policies that insufficiently 
protect human health. This can be to the benefit of vested interests, 
particularly where protective policies may have negative economic 
effects for the state or where key political decision-makers also have 
vested interests in affected economic industries. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) International Programme for 
Chemical Safety (IPCS) produces risk assessment documents entitled 
Environmental Health Criteria monographs. Its 1986 monograph on 
asbestos and other natural mineral fibres14 concluded that all types of 
asbestos could cause lung cancer. The Canadian, Russian and Indian 
asbestos industries and other powerful stakeholders actively lobbied 
for using chrysotile (white) asbestos under controlled conditions and 
downplayed evidence for its toxicity. In 1993 the IPCS Workgoup’s 
first draft of an updated monograph on chrysotile downgraded the 
carcinogenic risk associated with exposure to chrysotile asbestos.7 
This shocked the scientific community, which appreciated the 
evidence confirming carcinogenic risks associated with chrysotile 
asbestos. It emerged that members of the Workgroup were either in 
the employ of asbestos companies or were industry consultants, but 
had not declared this CoI in committee deliberations. 
After intense scrutiny and revision, the final report concluded there is 
no safe threshold of exposure for the carcinogenic risk of chrysotile, 
and recommended use of safer substitutes.15 More significantly for 
the policy-making process, the WHO introduced a stringent policy 
requiring declaration of CoI for all its workgroups involved in policy 
making and standard setting.7 This is an example of how governments 
(here a global ‘government’, the WHO) must ensure adequate balance 
of all vested and legitimate interests in their policy-making structures, 
and create tools to assure good public policy (e.g. CoI declarations 
and the balancing of vested interests). 
Despite such noble intentions, it remains difficult to implement 
such safeguards against CoI in policy decisions, particularly where 
industry and governments have shared economic interests. The 
WHO came under severe pressure from the USA government to 
temper its 2003 report on the obesity epidemic, which argued for 
limiting the amount of sugar in diets to promote health. Acting at 
the behest of the powerful USA sugar industry, the USA government 
threatened to withdraw its financial contributions to the WHO 
unless the policy was altered.16,17 
Elsewhere, civil society activists argued that the 2011 World 
Conference on Social Determinants of Health18 would provide a 
platform for corporates with vested interests to limit the extent to 
which UN-recommended policies would threaten their profits. A civil 
society Statement of Concern19 argued that the policy development 
process should not be ‘compromised by obvious conflicts of interests 
associated with food, alcohol, beverage and other industries, that 
are primarily answerable to shareholders’. An alternative civil society 
declaration urged the WHO to adopt a code of conduct to ensure 
transparency in decision-making and appropriate management of 
CoI, particularly regarding organisations with commercial interests.20 
As a result of this civil society pressure, the conference’s final report 
made three references to ‘safeguarding against conflict of interests’. This 
was directed at member states, but no reference was made to ensuring 
such safeguards apply to the WHO itself. Indeed, a commentary from 
the WHO Department of Ethics, Equity, Trade and Human Rights, 
released to coincide with the Rio Conference in October 2011, makes 
no mention of CoI in its discussion of action on social determinants 
needed to address non-communicable disease.21 This illustrates the 
difficulties of implementing WHO CoI policy in practice.
While filling different senior executive positions at the WHO between 
1995 and 2005, Derek Yach was responsible for some of the most 
influential public health promotion interventions on tobacco. In 
2007 he became vice-president of food conglomerate Pepsico, 
with the stated intention of using his corporate base to advance a 
public health agenda and promote a key role for the food industry 
in stemming rising rates of nutrition-related chronic diseases.22,23 
However, detractors have criticised this attempt to influence 
corporate policy as irrevocably conflicted,24 or as ‘corporate capture’ 
of public health.25 Shah, conversely, viewed Yach’s move positively, 
pointing to the increasing role of the private sector, whose resources 
dwarf those of public bodies (including the WHO), in funding and 
leading the global fight against disease. 26
What is clear is that every individual or organisation participating 
in developing public policy must be required to declare potentially 
conflicting interests, as must the governance body (e.g. WHO or 
a national government). This will ensure a process that manages 
CoI by ensuring equality between participants, with and without 
vested interests. 
The liquor industry as a case study of 
institutional CoI
The SA liquor industry deserves our critical attention.27 National and 
provincial legislative reviews, together with public health research 
on alcohol’s significant contribution to the burden of disease (BoD), 
have focused attention on alcohol policy. Research findings have 
highlighted premature mortality, increased morbidity, and damages/
costs to the economy and the state sector.28 
Alcohol is the third largest contributor29 to the national BoD. It 
accounted for an estimated 6% of SA’s burden of death and disability 
in 2004 (1.3 million years of life lost through dying prematurely 
from an alcohol-related cause, or years lived with an alcohol-
related disability). Of this figure, 41% resulted from alcohol-related 
intentional and unintentional injuries; 32% from alcohol-related 
infectious diseases; 13% from alcohol-related non-communicable 
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diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, cancers and liver cirrhosis; 
and 12% from alcohol-related neuropsychiatric disorders.30 It has 
been conservatively estimated that alcohol use cost the state sector 
(national and provincial) R17.2 billion in 2009.28
The WHO has passed various resolutions on alcohol at the World 
Health Assembly since 2006 which, alongside the activities of 
the WHO Secretariat, has focused attention in SA on the need to 
address harmful alcohol use. In May 2010 the WHO approved the 
Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol,31 which makes 
a clear case for countries to consider implementing evidence-based 
strategies to reduce the occurrence of heavy drinking episodes and 
the prevalence of alcohol use disorders. These strategies include 
regulating the availability and price of alcohol to reduce accessibility, 
stricter controls on alcohol marketing, as well as strengthening 
the capacity of health services to screen for risk and conduct brief 
interventions for hazardous and harmful drinking at primary 
healthcare and other settings.32-34
Alcohol policy in SA: Prevention of harm 
and industry advocacy
However, policy developments in SA have been uneven. In 2003 
the ANC government35 introduced the first legislation to provide for 
liquor legislation at provincial and national level. Then, in 2007, the 
ANC-led Western Cape Provincial Government passed the Western 
Cape Liquor Bill, and advertised its intention to remove zoning 
restrictions under the Land Use Planning Ordinance (Number 15 
of 1985) throughout the province. The aim was to encourage black 
entrepreneurs, as set out in the preamble to the Bill (see Annex 1), by 
allowing small tavern owners in the informal sector to operate legally 
within residential areas. This ordinance would have regularised the 
de facto liquor distribution networks set up by the South African 
Breweries (SAB) for unlicensed shebeens. But in 2008 a government 
change in the Western Cape aborted this legitimisation of informal 
alcohol distribution, and provided opportunities to strengthen 
controls over the liquor industry. 
More recently, the ministries and departments of health, social 
development and transport, acting on a mandate from cabinet, and 
the Western Cape and Gauteng provincial governments have signalled 
their intention to take stronger action to reduce harmful use of alcohol. 
In March 2011 the President and eight cabinet members attended 
the Second Biennial Substance Abuse Summit, which tabled several 
resolutions addressing substance abuse in SA that included raising 
the drinking age, not allowing any drinking and driving, and banning 
alcohol advertising.36 Notably, however, some national government 
ministries and departments, in particular the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), have shown greater ambivalence toward taking more 
decisive action on harmful alcohol use. 
Recognising the imminent policy changes the liquor industry, in 
particular its major player, SAB, has made an unprecedented effort 
to influence alcohol policy. SABMiller, headquartered in the UK, is the 
world’s second largest brewing company with substantial resources 
for lobbying. A key component of its alcohol strategy in SA is to 
channel more resources into building partnerships with government, 
which includes supporting ‘regulators in building capacity and 
capability’.37 We believe SAB is entering or seeking to enter into 
partnerships with government departments to influence the policy 
debate, by selectively promoting policy options that would protect 
their profits. 
The industry has sought to present themselves to government as 
socially responsible, and to deflect attention from the widespread 
misuse of their products by a broad spectrum of consumers, by 
framing misuse as a problem within a few high-risk sub-groups. 
Despite the evidence that SA has extremely high rates of problem 
drinking,38 industry arguments perpetuate the myth that it is a 
‘relatively small percentage of South Africans’ who abuse alcohol, 
and whose actions have ‘a disproportionately negative impact on 
South African society’. 39 Claiming to exercise its ‘responsibility to lead 
the attack on alcohol abuse,’39 industry argues that what is needed 
is not more regulation or legislative change but better enforcement 
of existing laws, more public education and greater scope for self-
regulation in areas such as alcohol advertising.
SAB has sought out highly visible partnerships with government. 
In October 2010 the CEO of SAB and the National Minister of 
Social Development sent a joint invitation to a broad grouping of 
stakeholders to attend a two-day strategic planning workshop on 
fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Although purportedly a joint initiative, 
the meeting was driven by SAB, with the department playing a minor 
role. Concerned that SAB’s role constituted a clear CoI, public health 
academics, researchers and others lobbied their colleagues not 
to attend. Moreover, the focus on FAS potentially reframes a social 
problem with systemic roots into a behavioural problem of individuals 
(women who drink during pregnancy). While FAS prevention merits 
specific attention, the risk of focusing only on pregnant women as a 
risk group draws attention away from upstream interventions which 
may threaten sales and corporate profits. 
The meeting went ahead and, despite fewer participants than 
expected and a shortened programme, SAB achieved good publicity, 
with a laudatory newspaper headline claiming ‘SAB helps with 
alcohol syndrome’.40 Thus, despite questionable programmatic value, 
and lukewarm scientific reception, the initiative promoted the brand 
of a company whose products contribute to the problem that was 
supposedly being addressed. 
In November 2010, SAB made a similar attempt to partner with the 
Western Cape Department of Health to address alcohol-related 
gender violence, drunk driving, underage drinking and FAS. The 
launch was aborted after public health practitioners and researchers 
lobbied the Premier’s office, arguing that the proposed programmes 
were not evidence-based, did not address the major alcohol-related 
harms and, consistent with the WHO recommendations, that it was 
not in government’s interests to partner with the liquor industry. 
In September 2011, SAB invited stakeholders to a meeting to inform 
them about a planned underage drinking initiative in partnership 
with DTI. The invitation claimed that the organisers had ‘considered 
local and international best practice in order to create a programme 
with highest possible efficacy’, yet they primarily proposed an 
educational/information campaign comprising school road shows, 
ambassadors in schools, workshops to educate the community and 
teachers, posters in taverns surrounding schools, township murals 
and exhibitions in shopping centres. There is little evidence that such 
interventions are effective, particularly compared with reducing 
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access to alcohol. SAB’s seeming concern about underage drinking 
has not extended to interventions that have been shown to be 
effective, particularly restricting advertisement of alcohol products 
where there is likely to be high youth exposure (e.g. on billboards 
near schools, universities or on routes to and from schools; or on radio 
and TV before 9 pm, at sporting events or on social media sites).32,33
In February 2012, SAB invited stakeholders to a launch in Phoenix, 
KZN, of another initiative to curb underage drinking. The invitation 
was sent in the name of the KZN MEC for Education and SAB’s 
executive director for corporate affairs and transformation. An 
SAB media release on the day referred to the partnership between 
itself, the DTI and the National Youth Development Agency.41 In 
response, a broad grouping of stakeholders wrote to the Inter-
Ministerial Committee on Substance Abuse (IMC), raising concerns 
about the liquor industry’s involvement in joint events co-hosted 
with government, and pointing out the attendant CoI. No response 
was received from the IMC, but an article in Business Day42 quoted 
a spokeswoman for the Department of Social Development who 
indicated that the department was finalising a cabinet memo to all 
national and provincial government departments to regulate and 
restrict their interaction with the liquor industry. 
The article referred to a 2011 letter from the Minister of Social 
Development instructing all provincial premiers not to ‘partner with 
any company in the liquor industry, even in programmes that the 
industry describes as part of their own initiatives to reduce alcohol-
related harm.’ The minister indicated that government would ‘engage 
with the liquor industry as a key stakeholder [to] develop policy and 
legislation to reduce alcohol-related harm,’ but warned that ‘when 
government partners with industry it tends to improve the brand 
image of the industry and by association the products it produces 
and markets.’ This was particularly true when it came to ‘responsible 
drinking’ messages aimed at adolescents and youth42.
In another case of CoI, the Global Fund for Tuberculosis, AIDS 
and Malaria (GFTAM) awarded SAB funding for a speculative HIV 
prevention intervention targeting male perpetrators of violence in 
shebeens, an intervention with little evidence of effectiveness. In 
response to allegations of complicity in corporate capture, the GFTAM 
asserted that, far from acting irregularly, they had only supported 
the SAB proposal based on approval from the national co-ordinating 
mechanism – viz. the South African Department of Health.44 If true, 
this is a case of a government department supporting an untested 
intervention, run by a private corporation whose massive profits 
irrevocably depend on alcohol sales. It is another worrying example 
of industry influence over state decision-making on alcohol policy. 
Provincial governments have been signing on to partnerships in 
SAB’s Responsible Trading Programme, previously known as the 
Mahlashedi programme. Initiated by SAB in 2002, the programme 
aims to normalise the retail liquor sector by helping and motivating 
owners of unlicensed liquor outlets (primarily shebeens) to 
enter the regulated sector.45 SAB has four strategies: (i) providing 
assistance with licensing (free consultancy and lodgement services 
for applicants) and licensing workshops; (ii) lobbying regarding 
provincial legislation; (iii) business skills training for taverners; and (iv) 
securing funding for taverners. The project had  positive outcomes 
for participants, including a 30% increase in average turnover, and 
substantial increases in profits,45 but no reports were found of its 
impact on alcohol abuse or alcohol-related harms. In 2010, SAB 
partnered with the Gauteng Department of Economic Development 
on this project; and in 2011 the Western Cape Department of 
Economic Development followed suit, despite protests from public 
health experts. 
Public health versus private profit
We argue that the conflicting interests of the alcohol industry and 
the public health sector constitute an irreconcilable culture clash 
well described by Munro and de Wever.46 As a private corporation, 
SAB’s obligation to its shareholders is to increase sales of its products 
and the profit margins of its operations. Its investment in social 
responsibility activities typically comprises a small fraction of profits. 
While attempting to partner with government on alcohol harm 
reduction programmes and to burnish its social responsibility image, 
SAB simultaneously launched its ‘Bigger is better’ campaign to 
promote its 750 ml bottles of Black Label beer. The advertisement (Fig. 
1) depicts a 340 ml bottle hiding behind the 750 ml one, and implies 
that a ‘grootman’ (big shot) drinks from the larger bottle while the 
smaller one is for a ‘laaitie’ (youngster). This advertisement targeted 
young drinkers and contravened the industry’s own advertising code 
by encouraging customers to drink more, illustrating the weakness 
of relying on industry self-regulation. SAB withdrew the advert 
only after widespread protests and a complaint lodged with the 
Advertising Standards Authority. 
Partnerships with the alcohol industry are thus highly fraught 
– industry gains considerable public relations and marketing 
benefit while the impact of its alcohol-related harm-reduction 
programmes is limited. SAB acted to profit from alcohol sales, 
particularly targeting young people, while simultaneously 
seeking credibility as part of the solution to the problems to 
which its products contribute. This CoI, in which industry uses 
social responsibility selectively, while campaigning against 
proven effective interventions, is widely recognised.47,48 Therefore 
the WHO has proposed arms-length engagement and dialogue 
rather than partnership as the appropriate mode of interaction 
with the alcohol industry.31
Fig. 1. SAB beer billboard.
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Why should health professionals and policy 
makers consider partnership with the 
alcohol industry off limits?
Jahiel and Babor49 highlight the alcohol industry’s role in sustaining 
an industrial disease epidemic, in which corporations and their 
allies promote products that are also disease agents. Corporations 
and Health Watch (CHW) includes the alcohol industry alongside 
five others that significantly affect public health through the 
commercialisation of hazardous products (alongside the tobacco, 
drugs, food, firearms and auto industries). They provide rules of 
thumb that public health and not-for-profit organisations should 
apply before partnering with industry,50 each of which places the 
alcohol industry off-limits in SA. 
CHW maintain that industries should ‘provide independent public 
health professionals and community representatives: a) access 
to corporate records, facilities, workers, research reports, health 
promotion budgets, and communications to conduct independent 
audits of the corporation’s health promotion, environmental, 
worker health and safety programs and human rights activities, and 
b) the right to immediately provide an independent written report 
to the public’. 
A review51 of the alcohol industry’s social responsibility investment 
(SRI) programmes found little formal evaluation in peer-reviewed 
publications to support evidence for effectiveness, but only opaque 
marketing materials (see, for example, http://www.sab.co.za/
sablimited/content/en/responsible-trader-programme; http://www.
sab.co.za/sablimited/content/en/alcohol-responsibility-drunk-
driving-programme; http://www.sab.co.za/sablimited/content/en/
underage-drinking-programme). Total alcohol sales data by volume, 
a key determinant of the alcohol burden, are not made readily 
available, except by the wine industry. The only data available are 
on profits derived from alcohol sales, and estimates of drinking need 
derived from population-based surveys.
CHW suggests industries should ‘fund independently developed 
health promotion publicity campaigns in amounts equivalent to 
the corporation’s advertising budget’. But the alcohol industry 
has resisted an initiative by public health and other social interest 
groups to establish an independent health promotion foundation 
to counter harmful messaging. They channel their SRI funding 
through an industry-funded Association for Responsible Alcohol 
use (ARA) that focuses its messaging on selected harms – FAS, drunk 
driving and underage drinking – and omits the main alcohol-related 
harms in South Africa.. These are popular targets for industry bodies 
internationally, perhaps because interventions are largely behavioural 
programmes aimed at individuals and, whether effective or not, are 
unlikely to reduce population-level drinking and therefore profits.
CHW maintains that industries should ‘keep all corporate health 
promotion and health education programs and activities free 
of corporate logos, the corporation’s name, products, symbols, 
figures, etc.’ In SA, liquor companies use their logos widely in their 
SRI campaigns. The liquor industry is a prominent funder of several 
NGOs, and recognised for co-funding initiatives in partnership with 
government. The SAB logo is prominent in the invitation regarding 
its initiative on underage drinking in partnership with the KZN 
government. (Fig. 2). 
Industries are also expected to ‘not make any contributions to 
election campaigns to political parties, political action committees, 
independent campaign advocacy organisations or lobbyists, or 
on ballot referenda or amendments’. Whether this happens in SA 
is difficult to ascertain because of the lack of regulations ensuring 
transparency of funding for political parties.”
In turn, CHW advocates that  no corporate officials accept employment or 
appointment to government regulatory agencies, boards or committees 
that have authority for any part of their industry’. Government has been 
a refuge for several influential alcohol industry directors, most notably 
Meyer Kahn, who was seconded from SAB to chief executive of the SA 
Police Service, before returning as chairman of South African Breweries 
plc upon its listing on the London Stock Exchange in 1999. 
Industries should also ‘pay the full statutory federal corporate tax 
rate’. Given the difficulty in obtaining primary data, it is difficult to 
assess the alcohol industry’s bona fides in SA. Nevertheless, SABMiller, 
the dominant company in SA and Africa, has been accused of a 
chequered tax record in low- and middle-income countries. For 
example, a detailed analysis of the behaviour of an SAB subsidiary 
in Ghana demonstrated extensive use of tax evasion strategies to 
boost corporate profit.52 SAB is also currently on a determined path 
of opening up the African low-income and traditional drink market 
on a continent where state regulation is weak.
What should be done about institutional CoI 
more generally?
Health and other professionals must think twice about the ethics of 
serving on industry-created bodies that use their presence to leverage 
public policy credibility. For example, the Foundation for Alcohol 
Research (ABMRF), set up as a partnership between academia and 
industry, lists 6 industry members on its board of trustees alongside a 
number of prominent academics. Similarly, the International Council 
on Alcohol Policies (ICAP) regularly commissions academics to write 
chapters in books they publish that promote an industry agenda.53 
ICAP is funded by SABMiller and other liquor companies. 
In finance-constrained economies, public institutions are 
increasingly pursuing public-private initiatives or partnerships. 
They need policies and systems to govern these partnerships, 
Fig. 2. Partnerships: use of an industry logo on a state programme to reduce 
alcohol-related harm.
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particularly in the case of industries producing socially harmful 
products.31 In a policy-making institution, CoI should be 
managed by an explicit code of ethics and set of procedures, 
which bind all participants whether they be professionals or 
elected or appointed officials. Representation of economic 
and social interests should be equally balanced, and policies 
affecting multiple government departments with conflicting 
interests should be developed by inter-sectoral bodies, not 
individual departments. In policy making and implementation, 
the permissible roles and boundaries of vested industrial 
interests should be clear. 
Public transparency should characterise the policy-making process, 
including declarations of CoI by all participants. Further, private 
industry should not be integral to the policy-making process through, 
for example, establishing partnerships. Rather, it should have the 
opportunity to engage with government. Should industry wish to 
contribute funding to any public policy-related process, this should 
take place via an arms-length relationship and industry should not 
decide its allocation or use.
All evidence used in policy making should be in the public domain. 
Where products such as reports are collectively authored, all 
contributors should be named together with their affiliations 
and whether or not they were supported indirectly or directly 
by industries with vested interests. This information should be 
monitored by the public institution concerned and by relevant 
regulatory bodies. For example, the HPCSA could incorporate such 
provisions into its guidelines for managing perverse incentives6 as a 
basis for overseeing professional behaviour related to policy-making.
Stakeholders, including the Medical Research Council, have proposed 
an independent Health Promotion Foundation (HPF),54 funded by a 
levy on alcohol and tobacco manufacturing. This levy will be used 
to pay for preventive interventions, including high-priority research 
that is free from the influence of vested industry interests. Such an 
independent foundation will be able to act without fear or favour 
to promote activities aimed at increasing responsible drinking and 
reducing harmful alcohol use, by funding research and counter-
advertising, stimulating alternative income-generation activities 
to wean small entrepreneurs off alcohol retailing, and supporting 
upstream interventions to reduce access to alcohol. An independent 
HPF should also monitor the liquor industry’s activities, particularly in 
the context of public-private ventures.
Conclusion
CoI is not inherently problematic if openly declared, and where 
evidence presented to support a policy can be subjected to peer 
review and critique. Problems arise when CoI is not declared or 
when informal channels of insider influence and reputation steer 
policy-makers; or when evidence is misrepresented, deliberately 
misinterpreted, or hidden.
While this article has focused on the example of the liquor industry, 
we believe the principles of how to identify, manage and address 
CoI are generic and can be extended to other areas where vested 
interest influences public policy processes that affect health. The 
interests of government and industry should be transparent and 
clearly differentiated in respect of the public good and the pursuit 
of profit. Where these interests overlap or co-exist (government may 
depend on product taxes, and the industry may wish to support a 
social responsibility programme geared to its product) there should 
be effective policies, procedures and processes for governing public-
private joint ventures. These should involve arms-length funding, 
maintenance of balance between contesting vested interests, and full 
disclosure of the identity and affiliations of all individual participants 
in structures and reports pertaining to public health policy-making. 
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